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The Impact of RFRA on Employment Discrimination: Will the Hobby Lobby Decision Erode
the Purpose of Title VII?
Introduction:
Throughout our nation’s history, many Supreme Court decisions have affected the
employer-employee relationship. A recent example was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 a
decision which arguably protected the free exercise rights of a private corporation above the
interests of its workers. The Court did so by allowing closely-held, private corporations to invoke
protections provided by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)2 like a private
individual could. Although corporate personhood is not a new concept, this was the first time
that the Supreme Court allowed Free Exercise Claims to be asserted by a company that is not
religious in nature or mission. Generally, a claim that a neutral law of general applicability
interferes with a plaintiff’s free exercise of religion is a Constitutional Claim.3 In 1990, the
Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, cut off
the availability of these types of claims by holding that neutral laws of general applicability
could not interfere with the First Amendment’s free exercise protections.4 Congress reacted by
enacting RFRA. The intent of RFRA was to restore the pre-Smith compelling interest test.5
However, interpretation of RFRA by the Supreme Court has shown that instead, RFRA
expanded available protections for business. The prediction by the Court in Smith,6 that a strict
compelling interest test would undermine many of our nations laws, has begun to come true. Not

1

134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb et seq.
3
See, e.g. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982); Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4
Id. at 878; see also 137 CONG. REC. E3083-02 (September 18, 1991) (statement of Hon. Glenn M. Anderson of
California) (“Justice Scalia is content to ignore the constitutional rights of two men because of the precedent he fears
it might set for mass exceptions to other generally applicable laws.”).
5
137 CONG. REC. E2422-01 (June 27, 1991) (statement of Hon. Stephen J. Solarz of New York).
6
494 U.S. at 888 (“many laws would not meet the [compelling interest] test. Any society adopting such a system
would be courting anarchy . . . We cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.”).
2

1

surprisingly, the dissent in Hobby Lobby also predicted the coming of many RFRA claims by
both religious and private employers, specifically warning of potential interference with longheld protections for employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and
the Fair Labor Standards Act.7 Though the majority states that the holding will not extend so far,8
some closely held corporations have already begun to use this holding to assert a RFRA defense
to Title VII discrimination claims.9 Our current Congress is probably unlikely to amend RFRA
again to curtail its expansion. Unless a limitation on these types of claims is adopted by the
Supreme Court, RFRA and Hobby Lobby could severely undermine protections against
discrimination in the workplace.
Part I of this paper will analyze the history and development of free exercise claims
against facially neutral laws in the employment context, including the passage of RFRA and its
applications. Part II will discuss the purpose of Title VII and how it relates to the government’s
compelling interest when challenged by free exercise claims. It will further examine religious
protections for both employers and employees which are already in place under Antidiscrimination statutes and the common law ministerial exception. Part III discusses whether
RFRA should be available as a defense against discrimination claims for closely-held, for-profit
corporations. Finally, Part IV concludes that if the RFRA defense is available, the existing
framework for analyzing religious defenses, the ministerial exception, should become the model

134 S.Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Suppose an employer’s sincerely held religious belief is offended
by . . . paying the minimum wage.”).
8
Id. at 2783 (“The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of
race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. . . . Our decision today provides no such
shield.”).
9
E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich 2016) (granting summary
judgment on Employee’s Title VII sex discrimination claim to funeral home employer where the “religious” owner
successfully asserted a RFRA defense), reversed and remanded, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018).
7
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for determining whether a neutral law substantially burdens the “religion” of a closely-held, forprofit employer.
I. Free Exercise Jurisprudence, From Sherbert to Hobby Lobby and Beyond
A. The Development of the Compelling Interest Test
The First Amendment prevents the government from making laws which expressly
interfere with a person’s free exercise of religion.10 As a result, it is hard to find a law which, on
its face, prefers or burdens a religious practice. However, there are many facially neutral laws
which could, when applied or enforced, burden a person’s free exercise of religion. Our
jurisprudence is full of these types of claims.11 To make such a claim, a person must show that
application and enforcement of a law to that person would violate their sincerely held religious
beliefs.12 An early case, which set forth the standard for finding a free exercise violation, was
Sherbert v. Verner.13
In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist who was prohibited by her sincerely
held religious beliefs from working on Saturdays, challenged the denial of her unemployment
compensation claim under South Carolina law.14 Her employer scheduled her to work Saturdays,

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”).
11
See, e.g. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requirement to pay social security tax violates sincerely held
beliefs of the Amish); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance violates sincerely
held religious beliefs of the Amish); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Com., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denying a
seventh day Adventist unemployment because she would not work on Saturday was a violation of the First
Amendment).
12
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006) (a "prima facie case
under RFRA . . . [shows that] application of [a neutral law] would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious
exercise.").
13
374 U.S. 398 (1963). Note that prior to Sherbert, claims of interference with a plaintiff’s free exercise of religion
were found to be without merit. See, e.g. Gallager v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961)
(holding that Massachusetts’s Sunday closing laws were not an impermissible burden on Orthodox Jewish plaintiff’s
religious beliefs which prevented him from doing business on Saturdays because the Sunday closing law did not
have religious purpose).
14
374 U.S. at 399-401.
10
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forcing her to quit, and she refused to take other employment that required Saturday work. 15 This
refusal to take available employment led to the denial of her unemployment benefits.16 The
plaintiff claimed that this denial was an impermissible burden on her free exercise of religion,
and the Supreme Court agreed.17 The Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s holding that because the law did not expressly burden religion on its face, she could not
make out a valid claim.18 For the first time, Justice Brennan articulated what became known as
the compelling interest test: if a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case that a facially neutral
and generally applicable law substantially burdens her free exercise of religion, the law cannot
be applied to that plaintiff unless the government can show that it (1) had a compelling interest in
applying the law and (2) enforcing the law against this plaintiff was the least restrictive means of
accomplishing its compelling interest.19 The South Carolina government failed to meet this high
burden, resulting in a finding that the denial of unemployment was unconstitutional as applied to
the plaintiff.20
Over the next twenty-seven years, the Court applied the Sherbert compelling interest test
to a handful of other cases, most often finding for the government.21 Most notable was the
Court’s consideration of compulsory Social Security Tax payments as applied to an Amish
employer.22 The Court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that since his Amish religion required

15

Id.
Id.
17
Id. at 404 (“The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”).
18
Id. at 401-02.
19
Id. at 406-07.
20
Id.
21
See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: an Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1407, 1412-16 (1992).
22
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
16
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him to take care of the elderly as part of a religiously-defined social welfare system, paying
money into a social security system he would not use was a substantial burden on his sincerelyheld religious belief.23 This was sufficient to meet the first prong of the compelling interest test.
Nevertheless, the Court found the Government’s compelling interest in preserving the Social
Security System outweighed the burden to the plaintiff, holding that “not all burdens on religion
are unconstitutional.”24 The Court commented that when a religious person chooses to operate a
business with a non-religious purpose and avail himself of the benefits therefrom, he inevitably
sacrifices some of his free exercise rights.25 Justice Stevens’s concurrence went further,
suggesting that if a person wants to challenge the government’s interference with his free
exercise of religion based on the application of a law of general applicability, the burden should
be on the challenger, not the government, to prove there is a “unique reason for allowing him a
special exemption.”26 In the years after Sherbert, the Court did not often hold in favor of
religious challengers to neutral laws.
B. The End of the Compelling Interest Test: Employment Division v. Smith
In 1990, with another challenge to the loss of unemployment benefits, the Court did away
with the compelling interest test, holding that incidental effects of neutral laws on free exercise
do not raise first amendment concerns.27 In Smith, the plaintiffs challenged the State’s denial of
their unemployment benefits after they were fired for the “misconduct” of smoking peyote, a
Schedule I narcotic, outside of work hours.28 The plaintiffs engaged in this act, illegal under
Oregon law, as part of a religious observance.29 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence points out that

23

Id. at 254.
Id. at 257.
25
Id. at 261.
26
Id. at 262. Subsequent jurisprudence has not gone in this direction.
27
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
28
Id. at 874.
29
Id.
24
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forcing the plaintiffs to choose to observe their religion or violate the law could easily be
interpreted as a substantial burden to the plaintiffs’ free exercise rights.30 However, the majority
declined to follow, and essentially overruled, the compelling interest test, holding that neutral
laws of general applicability should no longer be held to interfere with free exercise rights.31
It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion
. . . is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. . . . [W]e
have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate. . . . 32
The Court did not agree with the plaintiffs’ broad interpretation of the free exercise clause,
saying that “Respondents urge us to hold . . . when otherwise prohibitable conduct is
accompanied by religious convictions, . . . it must be free from governmental regulation. We
have never held that, and decline to do so now.”33 This holding reflected the Court’s worry that
such a strict burden on the government to defend free exercise claims against neutral laws would
lead to anarchy.34 However, in the years that followed, with Congress’ subsequent direction in
the form of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), the Court has reversed course,
broadening both the available challenges to free exercise burdens and the class of people that can
invoke a free exercise defense.
C. The Enactment of RFRA
RFRA was first introduced on July 26, 1990.35 A year later, Representative Stephen J.
Solarz reintroduced the bill, clearly stating Congress’ distaste for the Court’s decision in Smith.

Id. at 904 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 878.
32
Id. at 878-79.
33
Id. at 882.
34
Id. at 888. (“The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”).
35
Ryan, supra note 21, at 1436 and nn. 164-66.
30
31
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This legislation has the narrow purpose of restoring the compelling interest test . . . . The
test strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of the majority and the rights of
religious minorities. It would provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is burdened by Government.36
The current form of RFRA was introduced in both the house and the senate on March 11, 1993.37
The bill was overwhelmingly supported in both houses, and was signed into law on November
16, 1993.38 RFRA restores the compelling interest test, allowing claims of interference with free
exercise of religion to be a defense to the enforcement of any law, even one of general
applicability.39 A RFRA defense is a statutory claim, often made in addition to a constitutional
claim. The relevant text of RFRA is as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) EXCEPTION.—Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.40
It is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended to restore the compelling interest
and nothing more.41 However, in the years since RFRA’s passage, it has been used expansively
by individuals, not-for-profit religious organizations, and even private corporations to claim
exemptions from neutral laws of general application, expanding its reach beyond giving
guidance to the Court. The only curtailment of RFRA has been that it has been declared
unconstitutional as applied to State law.42 The states have had very different reactions to this;

36

137 CONG. REC. E2422-01 (June 27, 1991) (statement of Hon. Stephen J. Solarz of New York).
H.R. 1308 — 103rd Congress: Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr1308.
38
Id.
39
Pub. L. 103-141 (1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
40
Id.
41
Ryan, supra note 21 at 1410 n. 17, 1437 n. 166.
42
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511(1997).
37
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California applies the rational basis test to free exercise challenges,43 while Indiana enacted its
own RFRA which was intended to be even broader than the federal statute.44 It remains to be
seen how far the Court will go in protecting free exercise claims against neutral laws since the
passage of RFRA, however, it is clear that it has only been expanding since Smith.
RFRA is intended to be used as a defense to government action.45 Since its passage, the
Supreme Court has considered several claims which raise a RFRA defense against the
government.46 One important such case was Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal.47 This case has facts very similar to the claims rejected in Smith, making it a good
illustration of how the Court changed course after RFRA. Members of a small religious group,
the UDV church, challenged the government’s prohibition of their use of hoasca, a sacred
mixture which contained DMT, a Schedule I hallucinogen prohibited by the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”).48 The Court held that the church, by showing that “application of [a
neutral law] would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise," had made out a
prima facie case for a RFRA defense to enforcement of the CSA against them.49 The Court
remanded the case for consideration of a RFRA defense, saying that the Government now had
the ultimate burden of proof on the CSA’s constitutionality as applied to the church.50
Interestingly, the Court spent a lot of time discussing the current exceptions in the CSA for other

43

Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal 4th 527, 566-67 (2004).
Tyms-Bey v. State, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 11, *9-*12 (January 13, 2017).
45
42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a) (1993).
46
See, e.g. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) (RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the states);
Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) discussed infra, Section I.E.; Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. 2806
(2014) (holding that the reporting requirement for opting out of the contraceptive mandate of the ACA may also
violate RFRA); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853 (2015) (grooming policies for prisons which did not allow religiously
mandated beards violated RFRA); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (holding, in a case almost on all fours with Smith, that preventing the use of hoasca, a sacred drink
containing a Schedule I narcotic, made out a prima facie violation of RFRA.).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 425.
49
Id. at 428.
50
Id. at 429.
44
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Native American religious rituals which use Schedule I drugs.51 Because that exception already
existed, it likely was difficult for the Court to honestly hold that there was no less restrictive
means of burdening the UDV church’s free exercise of religion.
D. Where the Government is Not a Party, Circuits Disagree as to Whether RFRA is
Available as a Defense.
The Court’s holdings since the passage of RFRA clearly outline a path to relief against
government interference with free exercise. RFRA and the Gonzales decision lay out, in more or
less simple terms, the steps for a prima facie case and the high standards the government must
meet in order to satisfy the compelling interest test and burden a person’s free exercise of
religion. Nevertheless, there have been several attempts to expand the application of RFRA,
including attempting a RFRA defense against a private party instead of the government. The
availability of this defense remains somewhat of an open question.
The Seventh Circuit has expressly determined that RFRA is not available as a defense in
suits between private parties. In Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, the
Catholic Church of Milwaukee, facing bankruptcy, transferred $55 million into its cemetery
perpetual care funds in order to avoid paying its creditors, victims of church sexual abuse.52 The
creditors filed suit, claiming fraud under the bankruptcy code, and the church asserted defenses
under both RFRA and the First Amendment.53 The court held that since the creditors’ committee
was not acting “under color of law,” it was not the “government” for purposes of RFRA, and
therefore invoking RFRA as a defense was improper.54 However, the court recognized that the

51

Id. at 432-33.
780 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015).
53
Id.
54
Id. at p. 738 (no “close nexus” between the creditors’ committee and the government existed to invoke the State
Action Doctrine), 741.
52

9

creditors’ challenge raised First Amendment implications as to the activities of the Church.55
Since RFRA was unavailable, the court applied strict scrutiny to this constitutional claim, and
found that (1) the burden to the church was outweighed by the compelling governmental interest
of providing relief from bankruptcy to its citizens, and (2) it was narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.56 The court noted further that “The [Supreme] Court has rejected the idea that
fraudulent or improper actions can be excused in the name of religion.”57 The Court used
traditional constitutional analysis to find against the church, and also rejected the church’s
attempt to use a RFRA defense against a private party. In the Seventh Circuit, RFRA is not
available as a defense in suits between private parties.
The Second Circuit has other ideas about applying RFRA in suits between private parties.
In Hankins v. Lyght, a minister challenged his church’s mandatory retirement age for ministers
by filing an age discrimination suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”).58 The district court dismissed, saying that the common law ministerial exception
applied to bar the suit.59 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that “the RFRA must be deemed the
full expression of Congress' intent with regard to the religion-related issues before us and
displace earlier judge-made doctrines [the ministerial exception] that might have been used to
amelieorate the ADEA’s impact on religious organizations and activities.”60 In other words,
RFRA effectively amended the ADEA (and all statutes), and must be considered in religious

55

Id. at 741-42 (finding that making the $55 million available to the creditors could be a burden on the religious
activity of caring for the dead).
56
Id.; see also id. at 146 (like the importance of the availability of a strong social security system upheld against a
religious challenge in U.S. v. Lee, discussed infra Part I.A., providing a safety net (the bankruptcy code) for citizens
who experience financial trouble is a compelling government interest).
57
Id. at 749.
58
441 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2006).
59
Id.; see infra, Part II.B. for an explanation of the common law ministerial exception.
60
Id. at 102.
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challenges to neutral laws.61 Further, since the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(“E.E.O.C.”) had the ability to file this lawsuit on behalf of the minister, that was sufficient
governmental action to make RFRA available as a defense.62 The case was remanded for
consideration of the RFRA defense.63 Because of this holding, parties with free exercise claims
in the Second Circuit had to expressly waive their RFRA defense or it would be automatically
considered by the court.64 RFRA is now available as a defense to suits between private parties in
the Second Circuit.65
As of the writing of this paper, the Supreme Court has not considered this circuit split66
on whether RFRA applies to suits between private parties. Nevertheless, prior to invoking a
RFRA defense in employment claims, a court should ask the natural threshold question: what is
the nature of the employer/employee relationship? RFRA is intended to protect citizens against
interference by the government in their free exercise of religion. A private party should not be
excused from following the law in its interactions with other citizens, especially when it has
power over those citizens as employees, just because of his or her religious beliefs. Part of living
in a civilized society is sacrificing some personal autonomy for the greater good.67 Part of being

61

Id. at 104, 106.
Id. at 103 (“the substance of the ADEA’s prohibitions cannot change depending on whether it is enforced by the
EEOC or an aggrieved private party.”).
63
Id. at 109. Note that the church did not plead the RFRA defense, it was imposed by the court. On remand, the
court reached the same conclusion as it did the first time when applying the ministerial exception, and also held that
the ministerial exception was still a valid consideration in these types of claims. Hankins v. New York Conf. of the
United Methodist Church, 516 F.Supp.2d 225, 233, 236-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (further considering subsequent case
law which distinguished claims under RFRA from the ministerial exception).
64
See Rweyemanu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2008) (RFRA examines the burden on a sincerely held
religious belief, while the ministerial exception prevents the government from impermissibly interfering with
matters of church government and administration).
65
See Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (the court does not
want to consider RFRA as a defense between private parties but is bound by the decision in Hankins to do so).
66
In addition to the cases considered in the Seventh and Second circuits, the defense is not available in a suit
between private parties in the Third Circuit. See Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F.Supp.
3d 317, 325-26 (E.D. Penn. 2016).
67
See Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 (“When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on
the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”); John Locke, A Letter About Toleration, Chapter
62
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a business owner is sacrificing some property and liberty rights in order to take advantage of
certain laws.68
E. The Impact of Hobby Lobby on the RFRA Defense
In June of 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.69 The
Court was not considering the question of whether RFRA applied in suits between private
parties, but rather the Court considered an expansion of RFRA which would prohibit the
government from interfering with the sincerely held religious beliefs of a closely-held, for-profit
corporation. Brought as a challenge to the requirement, in the Affordable Care Act, that
employer-provided healthcare include contraceptive coverage (“the contraceptive mandate”), the
issue in Hobby Lobby was if corporate personhood extended far enough that a corporation’s First
Amendment free exercise right could be burdened.70 The claim was brought by the owners of
Hobby Lobby Stores (“The Greens”) and Conestoga Wood Specialties (“The Hahns”), two
“closely-held, for-profit” companies.71 Both the Greens and the Hahns run their companies
according to “Christian” values, including their personal belief that life begins at conception and
abortion is morally wrong.72 As a result, they objected to the all-inclusive contraceptive mandate

6(d) (1689), http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689b.pdf (“things that are forbidden by law
because in their ordinary use they are harmful to the public ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred
rites.”).
68
See 137 CONG. REC. E3083-02 (September 18, 1991) (Statement of Hon. Glenn M. Anderson of California) (In
support of the passage of RFRA, the congressman still says that “law must weigh restrictions on our constitutional
freedoms to protect societal order.”).
69
134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
70
Id. at 2770-74; c.f. Citizens United v. Federal Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (giving corporations the
first amendment right to free speech in the form of campaign contributions).
71
Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2766.
72
Id. at 2764-66. Conestoga’s board has adopted a “Vision and Values Statement” which affirms that Conestoga
endeavors to “ensur[e] a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects [the Hahns’] Christian heritage” and a
“Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,” including the belief that it is “against [their] moral conviction to be
involved in the termination of human life” after conception, which they believe is a “sin against God to which they
are held accountable.” “Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose commits the Greens to ‘[h]onoring the Lord in all
[they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.’ Each family member has
signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family assets to
support Christian ministries.”
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because they did not want to provide four “abortifacient” drugs to their employees.73 The Greens
and the Hahns, on behalf of their corporations, sued the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), the agency responsible for enforcing the Affordable Care Act, claiming
interference with their free exercise rights and a violation of RFRA.74
The Court gave extensive analysis to the arguments of HHS that a RFRA defense should
not be extended to closely-held, for-profit corporations, but rejected each, holding that Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga had sincerely held religious beliefs which were substantially burdened by
the contraceptive mandate.75 The substantial burden came in the form of the fines or penalties the
companies would have to pay if they failed to comply: amounts reaching the tens of millions of
dollars.76 The Court assumed there is a compelling government interest in ensuring that women
receive comprehensive health coverage, but it held that enforcing the mandate against Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and similar corporations was not the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.77 The Court allowed the plaintiffs to opt out of the contraceptive mandate using the
process already available to religious organizations.78
Perhaps the Court reached the conclusion it did because an exception to the contraceptive
mandate already existed for religious institutions.79 Certainly the availability of the exemption,
which allowed religious organizations with sincerely held religious objections to providing
contraceptives to opt out and let the insurance company cover the cost of contraceptives for its
employees,80 made it easy for the court to extend RFRA protection to for-profit corporations

73

Id. at 2765.
Id.
75
Id. at 2785.
76
Id. at 2775-76.
77
Id. at 2782 (the compelling interest was in preserving public health).
78
Id.
79
See 45 C.F.R. §147.131 (as amended on September 14, 2015 to include the types of corporations involved in
Hobby Lobby).
80
Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2782.
74
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with similar beliefs. Recall O’Centro, where the Court also pointed to the existence of a
previously-existing exception to reach the conclusion that the government had not used the least
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest.81 However, the Hobby Lobby holding
could have immense impact on free exercise jurisprudence if closely-held, for-profit corporations
start challenging other laws with a RFRA defense.82 Hobby Lobby was not the first case in which
a company challenged the new Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate, but its success
opened the door for other claims.83
F. Free Exercise and RFRA Claims Since Hobby Lobby
Since Hobby Lobby was decided, attempts have been made to expand the reach of its
holding. In several circuits, plaintiffs have claimed that even the required reporting form for the
exemption to the contraceptive mandate is too much of a burden, and the Supreme Court
agreed.84 One court has considered, but rejected, applying the Hobby Lobby exception to
organizations that object to the contraceptive mandate on moral, not religious grounds.85 An
injunction against enforcement of another part of the Affordable Care Act, the interpretation of
the meaning of “sex” for the purpose of providing gender-specific health services, was granted to
religious plaintiffs who would likely succeed on their RFRA claims that providing gender

81

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436-37 (2006).
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the Court’s view, RFRA demands
accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on
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transition services substantially burdened their free exercise of religion.86 The Catholic Church
of Milwaukee tried to use RFRA get out of complying with the bankruptcy code.87 There have
been others.
A concern of the dissent in Hobby Lobby was that, after the majority’s holding, private
employers would use a RFRA defense to all kinds of claims, including discrimination claims by
employees.88 Though the majority expressly stated that “[t]he Government has a compelling
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce,”89 there have been at
least two claims in the district courts since Hobby Lobby which test the Court’s resolve not to
allow a RFRA defense to Title VII.90
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court heard Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc.91 The plaintiff, an atheist, worked for a closely-held, for-profit HVAC
company whose owner wanted to run the company with Christian values.92 To that end, on the
back of each employee’s ID badge was the company’s mission statement:
This company is not only a business, it is a ministry. It is set on standards that are higher
than man’s own. Our goal is to run this company in a way most pleasing to the Lord.
Treating employees and customers as we would want to be treated along with running a
business as if we are all part of one big family is our plan.93
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Franciscan Alliance v. Burwell, 2016 WL 7638311, No. 7:16–cv–00108–O,*1 (N.D. Texas, December 31, 2016).
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As an atheist, the plaintiff was uncomfortable with this mission statement, so he covered it with
tape.94 When his boss found out, he was asked to remove the tape or leave the company.95 That
was his last day of employment.96 Mathis filed charges of discrimination against the company,
claiming that they had discriminated against him because of his religion, or lack thereof.97 The
company owners made it clear that they would have preferred Mathis to act like, if not actually
be, a Christian.98 The Company asserted a RFRA defense, claiming that forcing them to comply
with Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision by attempting to reasonably accommodate
Mathis’s atheism was a burden on the company’s free exercise rights.99 Using traditional Title
VII analysis, the court found that a reasonable jury could find that covering up the mission on his
badge with tape did not cause undue hardship to the employer and denied summary judgment to
the company.100 Unfortunately, the Mathis court did not address the merits of the company’s
RFRA defense because RFRA is not available as a defense in suits between private parties in the
Third Circuit.101 It could also be argued that the court was not convinced that it made sense to
excuse a company’s failure to accommodate an employee’s religious concerns by insisting that
the company’s religious beliefs were more important. Engaging in this type of inquiry not only
creates an unfair advantage for the employer, but could also violate the Establishment Clause.
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Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
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The Eastern District of Michigan was not afraid to engage in this kind of inquiry,
however. In E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the court allowed a private
employer to raise a RFRA defense to a sex discrimination claim, resulting in summary judgment
for the employer.102 The complainant, a biological man, worked for the defendant as a funeral
director.103 When he told his boss that he was transgender and would begin dressing as a woman,
he was fired.104 The E.E.O.C. filed a lawsuit on his behalf, claiming that this was sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.105
The defendant funeral home claimed a RFRA defense, even though it is “not affiliated
with or part of any church and . . . do[es] not avow any religious purpose. Its employees are not
required to hold any religious views.”106 However, it is a closely-held corporation, like the
companies in Hobby Lobby, whose owner believes that believes that he “would be violating
God’s commands if [he] were to permit one of the [Funeral Home’s] funeral directors to deny
their sex while acting as a representative of [the Funeral Home].”107 Further, the owner testified
that if he
were forced to violate [his] sincerely held religious beliefs by paying for or otherwise
permitting one of [his] employees to dress inconsistent with his or her biological sex, [he]
would feel significant pressure to sell [the] business and give up [his] life’s calling of
ministering to grieving people as a funeral home director and owner.108
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This was enough for the court to agree with the defendant that the funeral home had made out a
prima facie case that its free exercise rights would be violated if it had to follow the law and
allow the plaintiff to dress as a woman.109
The court then proceeded to analyze the next part of the RFRA test: whether the E.E.O.C.
had shown a compelling interest and whether the restrictions on the funeral home were the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.110 Assuming that enforcement of Title VII was a
compelling interest, the court found that the E.E.O.C. had not shown that insisting the funeral
home allow Stephens to dress as a woman was the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.111 Instead, the court seemed to chastise the E.E.O.C. for pushing an alternative agenda:
trying to “bootstrap” Title VII to include protections for gender identity.112 The outcome of this
case is that a closely-held, for-profit employer was successfully able to assert a RFRA defense to
a discrimination claim. As in Hobby Lobby, the court’s focus was on the government’s inability to
show that it was imposing the least restrictive means of enforcing a law which interfered with the
company’s free exercise. The E.E.O.C. has filed for an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which will
apply de novo review.113 On review, perhaps the court will distinguish this case from Hobby Lobby
by considering more strongly the first prong of the RFRA test, the substantial burden, and find that
the burden on the Funeral Home director’s religion, simply allowing an employee to dress like a
woman, is not nearly as substantial as millions of dollars in fines. Further, following Justice
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Id. at 855.
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Ginsberg’s reasoning in dissent, because the relationship between the funeral home owner and the
employee was not a religious one, the funeral home owner’s religious beliefs are too attenuated
from the discriminatory practices of the company to be a violation of RFRA. 114 Unlike Hobby
Lobby, the employer’s substantial burden claim was evaluated on a largely subjective, as opposed
to financial, basis. Though the government’s compelling interest in this case was assumed, just
like it was in Hobby Lobby, 115 there is not a substantial enough burden on the Funeral Home
Director’s religion to allow a RFRA defense and erode the purpose of Title VII.116
II. Employment Discrimination and the Free Exercise of Religion
A. The Purpose of Title VII and the Anti-Discrimination Statutes is to Eradicate
Workplace Discrimination, which is a Compelling Interest.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted with the purpose of eradicating
workplace discrimination in the United States.117 Title VII protects employees from
discrimination based on their race, color, national origin, sex, and religion.118 Title VII was
enacted with the purpose of righting a major societal wrong. We live in a nation that values equal
treatment, and these statutes are intended to ensure that minorities do not lose the means of
providing for themselves and their families simply because they are different. To that end, many

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2799 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would
conclude that the connection between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage requirement
is too attenuated to rank as substantial.”).
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proscriptions against sex discrimination to the Funeral Home would substantially burden Rost's religious exercise,
and therefore the Funeral Home is not entitled to a defense under RFRA; [and] even if Rost's religious exercise were
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courts have held that the government’s interest in enforcing anti-discrimination statutes is always
a compelling one.119
On the other hand, we live in a nation where the default is at-will employment. Ever since
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lochner v. New York,120 the freedom to enter into
employment contracts at-will has been an American staple. Anti-discrimination statutes interfere
with an employer’s ability to terminate an employee at-will; under the circumstances described
in such statutes, an employer must not interfere with the terms and conditions of their
employees’ employment just because of an immutable characteristic or deeply held belief.
Hobby Lobby further suggests an expansion to the class of employers that can claim religious
exceptions to the anti-discrimination statutes. The dissent warned of the perils of this expansion:
The Court’s determination that RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is bound to have
untoward effects. . . . [I]ts logic extends to corporations of any size, public or private. Little
doubt that RFRA claims will proliferate, for the Court’s expansive notion of corporate
personhood . . . invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based exemptions from
regulations they deem offensive to their faith.121
As shown in E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,122 this could have tremendous
implications for employee protections from discrimination in the future.
B. Protections for Religion for Both Employers and Employees
Under Title VII, employees are protected from discrimination on the basis of religion.
This is of course in addition to their First Amendment right to be free from governmental

See State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Minn. 1985) (“Invidious private
discrimination . . . has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”); E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich 2016); Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 440
F.Supp.2d 211, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (The
government has a compelling interest in providing equal opportunity in the workforce).
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burdens on their free exercise of religion. An employer is prohibited from making employment
decisions based on an employee or applicant’s religion or lack thereof.123 Further, an employer is
required to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion in the workplace, as long as it does
not cause undue hardship to the employer.124 Since claims under the First Amendment are
constitutional claims and RFRA is a statutory claim against the government, RFRA likely does
not protect an employee against his private employer, even in a discrimination suit.125 However,
Employers may assert a RFRA defense to discrimination claims in certain circumstances.
Religious employers are statutorily protected from interference with their religion.
Qualifying organizations such as churches, religious schools, organizations run by not-for-profit
religious orders, and others whose business purpose is religious in nature have a right, by
statutory exception,126 to prefer employees who share the organization’s beliefs. In addition, the
courts have also recognized a common-law “ministerial exception.”127 The ministerial exception
essentially protects religious organizations from “excessive government entanglement with
religion.”128 If an organization raises a successful ministerial exception argument, it will act as a
complete defense to a discrimination claim. The reasoning is simple: in the absence of direct
evidence of discrimination (which rarely exists), proving discrimination requires a plaintiff to
show that his or her employer’s reason for the challenged employment action is pretextual.129 A
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court cannot consider the “pretext” that a church’s “minister” did not properly observe or
promote his or her religion, without implicating the Establishment Clause.130 Therefore, if a
person bringing an employment discrimination claim against his religious employer is
considered to be a “minister” of that religious organization, someone responsible for relaying the
religious message to others, the court will not apply anti-discrimination laws to the employment
of the minister.131 The Supreme Court first discussed the ministerial exception is HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C..132 A teacher at the defendant’s
school brought discrimination claims when she was fired after a disability leave.133 The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff could not bring claims under the ADA because the teacher
was a “minister” of their faith.134 The Court discussed extensively the history and purpose of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, reiterating that the Constitution prevents the
government from interfering in a religion’s selection of “ecclesiastical individuals.”135 To that
end, the Court recognized a “ministerial exception” to discrimination claims against a religious
organization.136 Next, the court engaged in an extensive discussion of the plaintiff’s job duties,
training, expectations, and other related facts to determine that the plaintiff was, in fact, a
minister and the defendant was entitled to the complete defense offered by the ministerial
exception.137 What the Court in Hosanna-Tabor made clear is that whether or not the ministerial
exception applies as a defense to a religious discrimination claim by an employee is a fact-
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specific inquiry which must be carefully considered in each case, so that the court does not
impermissibly entangle itself in the affairs of the church.138
The ministerial exception is not available if the employee is not a “minister.” This is
similar to a RFRA defense, which can only be invoked where there is a “substantial burden” to
free exercise. An employer who believes that a law substantially burdens its free exercise of
religion may argue either that it is entitled to the ministerial exception or that it has a defense
under RFRA. Both protect a religious employer’s right to statutory exceptions to laws of general
applicability. The analysis should be the same: if the employer/employee relationship is not
established as a religious one, neither the ministerial exception nor RFRA should be available to
the employer as a defense. For example, in E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,
the funeral home owner claimed that his sincerely held religious beliefs would be burdened by a
male employee dressing as a female at work.139 However, he did say that his religious beliefs
would not be offended by Stephens dressing as a woman outside of work.140 This comment
should have undermined the sincerity of his religious beliefs and stopped the inquiry into the
RFRA defense.141 Regardless, whether sincerely or not, employers have attempted to invoke
both of these defenses many times since RFRA’s passage.
C. RFRA As a Possible Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims
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Since RFRA was enacted, there have been several attempts by employers to invoke its
protections after being sued for employment discrimination. One of the first, and probably the
one to take such a defense the most seriously, was Hankins v. Lyght.142 Recall that in Hankins,
the Second Circuit imposed a RFRA defense on the employer of a minister who had filed for age
discrimination, saying that RFRA should be the extent of the religious inquiry in free exercise
claims.143 This holding also displaced the common law ministerial exception, at least
temporarily, in the Second Circuit. On remand, the court said that the ministerial exception was
not necessarily replaced by RFRA; instead, since it would be impermissible under the First
Amendment for the court to interfere with the church’s process for choosing its ministers, a
finding that the challenged action was subject to the ministerial exception was prima facie
evidence of a substantial burden.144 Therefore, in circumstances where a the employment of a
“minister” at a religious institution is at stake in the Second Circuit, the employer meets the first
prong of the RFRA defense, the substantial burden, if the employee qualifies as a minister under
the common law ministerial exception.145
This holding was based largely on the district court’s decision in Redhead v. Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists.146 The defendant employer in Redhead was a religiously-run
elementary school.147 When the plaintiff employee, an unmarried female, became pregnant, the
defendant fired her because her pregnancy was evidence of “fornication,” conduct prohibited by
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the employer’s religion.148 She filed claims of sex discrimination under Title VII, and the
defendant asserted RFRA as its defense.149 The court did not want to consider RFRA given that
this was a suit between two private parties, but was bound by the circuit precedent in Hankins to
do so.150 Interestingly, the court re-examined the relationship between RFRA and the ministerial
exception, holding that the two were not mutually exclusive.151 Instead, applying the ministerial
exception, it found that because the plaintiff was not a “minister,” there was no substantial
burden to the school’s free exercise and therefore RFRA was not implicated.152 Further, the court
surmised that
the ministerial exception guards against excessive entanglement and is a tool for analyzing
the nature of the alleged burden on religious exercise. It is . . . relevant to whether a
religious organization’s hiring decisions regarding a particular individual should be
insulated based on First Amendment concerns. . . . For the RFRA analysis in particular, the
ministerial exception is necessary for a case-specific application of the compelling interest
test.”153
Most likely, if this case had been decided one year later after Hobby Lobby, the outcome
would be different. It seems apparent after Hobby Lobby that if religious non-profits and closely
held for-profit corporations with religious owners can claim a RFRA defense to a neutral law, so
can non-profit hospitals run by religious organizations. In the Second Circuit, under the right
circumstances, a “religious employer,” regardless of not-for-profit status, could raise a RFRA
defense to a Title VII claim of discrimination.154 Those circumstances are limited but were
definitely expanded after Hobby Lobby, as is evidenced by E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
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Homes, Inc.155 However, the existence of an almost automatic compelling interest in eradicating
workplace discrimination should (1) severely limit the circumstances under which a RFRA defense
can be brought and (2) require courts to use a ministerial exception type analysis when evaluating
whether the religious burden on an employer is “substantial.” Such an in-depth, case-by-case
analysis is sensitive to First Amendment concerns and will prevent abuse of the RFRA defense.
III. Closely-held, For-profit Corporations Should Not Be Able to Use RFRA as a Defense to
Employment Discrimination Claims.
Hobby Lobby expanded the types of organizations that can claim a RFRA defense. Prior
to Hobby Lobby, in order to claim that any law interfered with a party’s free exercise of religion,
that party had to have a “religion.” Logically, then, the claim was available to individuals and to
religious organizations. After Hobby Lobby, “religion” can be attributed to closely-held, forprofit, private corporations when the company’s owners have sincerely held religious beliefs. It
is possible, based on precedent, that these types of corporations could use RFRA as a defense
when faced with employment discrimination claims, if they can show that the government’s
enforcement of those anti-discrimination statutes against them substantially burdens a sincerely
held religious belief. Of course, under the language of RFRA, if a company makes such an
assertion, the government must have a chance to show that enforcing the law is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. The government has a strong
compelling interest in preventing discrimination in the workplace, which should not be displaced
with laws like RFRA. The courts should not allow closely-held, for-profit corporations to assert
RFRA as a defense to a claim of employment discrimination because it will undermine the
purpose of Title VII.156 If, however, the Court allows such a defense, it should be used only
155

See 201 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), reversed and remanded, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. March 7, 2018),
discussed infra, section I.F.
156
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (“The principal dissent raises the possibility
that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal

26

where (1) the government is a party and (2) a standard is established for evaluating whether there
is a substantial burden on the company’s free exercise of religion. Applying a ministerial
exception-type analysis to evaluate the employer-employee relationship would be an appropriate
“substantial burden” standard that aligns with prior precedent.157 Only in those narrow
circumstances should the Court apply the RFRA compelling interest test.
A. Most Employment Discrimination Lawsuits are Between Two Private Parties. If the
Government is Not a Party, It Would Be Too Burdensome To Assert The
Compelling Interest in Every Claim
When an employee feels he or she has been discriminated against by an employer, he
must file a charge with the E.E.O.C. or with the equivalent state organization.158 The E.E.O.C.
may decide, based on the charge, to enforce the anti-discrimination statutes against that employer
itself, but most often it issues a Notice of Right to Sue, allowing private parties to file their own
claims.159 It is easy to see how the government’s purpose in enacting anti-discrimination statutes,
to try to eradicate workplace discrimination, is, without further inquiry, a compelling interest.
However, the least restrictive means test is a fact intensive inquiry. Applying RFRA to
employment discrimination claims would create a huge burden on the government to intervene in
order to satisfy this inquiry. The E.E.O.C. already has an incredible backlog of cases; requiring it
to assert defenses to RFRA claims between private parties would stretch its resources even
further, undermining its mission.

sanction. . . . Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an
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Assuming RFRA is available as a defense in suits between private parties, a typical claim
might be as follows: a single, unmarried female employee of a Christian book store decides that
she is ready to have children and begins to receive fertility treatments. The owner of the store has
a sincerely held religious belief that it is a sin to have children out of wedlock. He believes that
allowing her to take time off to go for fertility treatments substantially burdens this religious
belief, since he has to pay other employees to cover for her.160 Believing he has no alternative, he
fires her. She brings a claim under Title VII, alleging that the termination was because of her sex.
She can likely make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination: Under the McDonnell-Douglas
framework, she can show that (1) she was a member of a protected class (female); (2) she was
qualified for her position (she was working there); (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action (she was fired); and (4) similarly situated employees who were not female were treated
differently (men who wanted to take time off for medical treatments were probably not fired).161
The book store, acting through its owner, would then assert an affirmative defense under RFRA.
He could show that application of Title VII to him in this situation (requiring him to retain this
employee) (1) substantially burdened (2) his sincerely held (3) religious belief.162 Assuming he
was successful, the court would then apply the Compelling Interest test. This is something the
government, not the plaintiff, has to prove; the E.E.O.C. would have to intervene to make an
argument that applying Title VII to this employer is not only a compelling interest, but that under
the specific facts of the case, it is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. This
is absolutely unworkable. The current system for processing charges of discrimination already
takes 2-3 years from filing to verdict; if the E.E.O.C. had to intervene every time an employer

160

Part of the substantial burden analysis includes the cost to the employer of complying with the law. See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2775-76.
161
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.792, 802 (1973).
162
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficiente Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006).

28

asserted a RFRA defense it would take much longer. A RFRA defense would not be asserted in
every discrimination claim, but any case which is not litigated by the E.E.O.C. in which the
employer did assert a RFRA defense would then need to be addressed with E.E.O.C. resources.
This would affect the E.E.O.C.’s ability to process all charges. The impact to the general public
is just too great to allow such a process to occur. RFRA should not be available as a defense to
discrimination claims, especially when suits are brought by private parties.
B. Penalties to Private Employers of Not Complying with Title VII are Mostly
Equitable in Nature, Therefore They Do Not Create a Substantial Burden
If such a defense is allowed, a closely-held, for-profit employer must prove the first
prong of the RFRA defense: application of a general law causes a substantial burden on the
employer’s free exercise of religion. In Hobby Lobby, this burden came in the form of substantial
monetary penalties for failing to comply with the law that created the burden.163 However, in
employment discrimination claims, the traditional remedies for plaintiffs are equitable in
nature.164 This usually includes things like backpay, expenses, and reinstatement or front pay.
Plaintiffs can receive compensatory and punitive damages for their discrimination claims, but
there are significant caps on the amounts. For example, an employee of the largest class of
employer would only get up to $300,000 for such damages in a Title VII claim.165 In the above
example, if it was found that the bookstore owner had in fact acted unlawfully in terminating the
pregnant employee, he would likely only be responsible for her back wages, some front pay, and
if the conduct was willful, a few thousand dollars in further damages. This is far from the
millions at stake in Hobby Lobby.
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The available remedies make it clear that complying with Title VII does not create a
substantial financial burden on an employer. Unlike the potential penalties imposed under the
ACA, paying one employee’s backpay and even up to an additional $300,000 in compensatory
damages could not amount to any significant damage for a multi-million dollar company like
Hobby Lobby. If an anti-discrimination statute truly burdens a company’s free exercise of
religion, the financial burden of non-compliance will not be enough on its own to create a
substantial burden on religion. Instead, courts should apply a ministerial exception type analysis
to determine if forcing the relationship between the employer and the employee to continue
would cause the substantial burden on the company’s free exercise of religion, without further
trammeling the rights of the employee.
C. In Religious Discrimination Cases, Allowing a RFRA Defense Would Require
Courts to Engage in Unconstitutional Balancing of the Rights of Employees Against
the Rights of Employers.
When an employee claims that his or her employer has engaged in unlawful
discrimination under Title VII because of religion, that claim will require the employee to prove
that the employer failed to accommodate his religious practices or that the terms and conditions
of employment substantially burden the employee’s free exercise of religion.166 Allowing an
employer to assert a RFRA defense under those circumstances would pit the employer’s free
exercise rights against the free exercise rights of the employee. A court cannot engage in
choosing whose religion is more important by determining if RFRA trumps Title VII – that
would surely implicate the Establishment Clause.
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Practically, a RFRA defense to a Title VII claim, on its face, means that the employee
suffered an adverse employment action because of (a failure to participate in the employer’s)
religion. If the employee’s conduct, or a law which protects such conduct, substantially burdens
the employers’ religion, it stands to reason that such conduct does not substantially burden the
employee’s religion. Therefore, if an employer takes action against the employee for that
conduct, it would be because the employee’s religion was not the same as the employer’s. Title
VII makes it unlawful to take an adverse action against an employee because of his religion.
RFRA should not be available as a defense because, if successful, it would value the employer’s
religion over the employee’s.
Further, consider a situation where the conduct is the result of the employee’s religious
beliefs or lack thereof, such as the employee in Mathis who covered up the religious message on
his ID badge because he was an atheist.167 Here, a RFRA defense would essentially force a court
to choose between the employee’s right to be free from religious discrimination in the workplace
and the employer’s right to be free from burdens on his free exercise by laws which force him to
retain this employee. Choosing between one religion and another is a direct violation of the
Establishment Clause. RFRA should clearly not be available as a defense in religious
discrimination claims.
IV. Conclusion: A Ministerial Exception Like Analysis Should Be Used to Determine
Whether a Closely-Held, For-Profit Company Can Meet the Substantial Burden Prong of
the RFRA Compelling Interest Test.
Since Congress articulated the need to address rampant workplace discrimination through
the passage of Title VII in 1964, employers have raised all kinds of creative defenses.
Interference with the employer’s First Amendment free exercise rights is just one of them. This
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is understandable; the freedom to contract and the concept of employment-at-will are two
strongly rooted practices and beliefs for most business owners and employers. The preservation
of the right to free exercise of religion, without substantial burden by the government, is also
something extremely important to everyone in the United States. Under RFRA, no law, even a
neutral law of general applicability, can substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion
without showing that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest.
There should be very narrow circumstances under which the free exercise right outweighs the
right to be free from discrimination in the workplace. These would be the only possible
circumstances under which a closely-held, for-profit corporation could raise a RFRA defense to
an employment discrimination claim.
These narrow circumstances occur when two conditions are present. First, the
government would have to be a party; in other words, the claim would need to be brought by the
E.E.O.C. Second, the court would need to engage in a standard inquiry regarding whether or not
the defendant sustains a substantial burden on its free exercise. This standard inquiry would be
similar to the inquiry made when an organization wants to invoke the common law ministerial
exception. In cases of a RFRA defense, it would be necessary to examine the nature of the
relationship between employer and employee. If the relationship is one where it is the
employee’s responsibility to further a religious mission of the company, then a fact-intensive
analysis, similar to that applied for the ministerial exception, should be applied to determine if,
as a threshold matter, not discriminating against the employee is a substantial burden on the
company. If, however, the relationship is not “ministerial,” that is, it does not further a religious
mission, then RFRA should not be allowed, whether the company qualifies as one that can claim
the RFRA defense under Hobby Lobby or otherwise. This type of inquiry would not run afoul of
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the establishment clause, because it is not a question of whether the practice of not
discriminating against an employee involves a burden on a practice central to the employer’s
religion, but whether the nature of the relationship could burden religion in a substantial way.168
It should be emphasized that not-for-profit religious organizations use labor to promote religion,
while closely-held for profit companies use labor to make money.169 This distinction should not
be ignored when considering whether a company has a valid RFRA defense. Instead, the inquiry
should focus on the “function of the position at issue.”170
A hypothetical example can illustrate this theory. Suppose two female employees of
Hobby Lobby are fired, both for dressing too provocatively. One employee is a cashier, and the
other is the Vice President of Marketing. They both go to the E.E.O.C., which agrees to litigate
the cases together, as an example of blatant discrimination because of sex. In response to the
lawsuit, Hobby Lobby asserts a RFRA defense, arguing that allowing women to dress in a
provocative manner in the workplace is a substantial burden on the company’s sincerely held
religious belief that women must dress modestly. They claim that the women’s style of dress
reflected poorly on the company’s Christian image and alienated its customers, causing a loss of
business, interference with their branding and marketing strategy, and confusion in the
marketplace. In order to determine if forcing Hobby Lobby to allow these women to wear their
clothing of choice is in fact a substantial burden, the court should engage in a fact specific
inquiry to determine whether the dress of these employees actually has an impact on the
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company’s religion. The court should consider similar facts to those it would consider when
determining whether the ministerial exception applies. In this hypothetical example, it is
conceivable that the Vice President of Marketing for Hobby Lobby would be the person in
charge of promoting the company’s “Christian” image and mission. Dressing in a manner
directly in conflict with that image in mission is plausibly a burden on the company’s religion.
However, the cashier’s duties are arguably too attenuated from the mission of the company for
her clothing to have any meaningful impact on the company’s religious mission. She may
interact with customers, but only in one store and only sometimes. Even if her style of dress
suggests a clearly “un-christian” set of values, that single employee’s actions cannot be imputed
to the company as a whole. Though it may still not be enough to overcome the compelling
interest in preserving a workplace free from discrimination, Hobby Lobby should only be able to
assert the RFRA defense as to the Vice President of Marketing’s discrimination claim, not the
cashier’s discrimination claim.
Importantly, if courts apply this analysis and do not find a substantial burden, that would
act to bar the RFRA defense. If the courts do find a substantial burden, then the result would
differ from the ministerial exception in one important way. Once a court finds that an employee
is a “minister,” that acts as a complete defense to a discrimination claim. Once a court finds that
an employee’s discrimination claim is a “substantial burden” on a closely-held, for profit
corporation’s sincerely held religious beliefs, then the court must proceed to the rest of the
compelling interest test to determine if RFRA acts to bar the discrimination claim. RFRA itself is
clear that if a neutral law of general applicability substantially burdens free exercise of religion,
the government must justify the application of that law as the least restrictive means of furthering
a compelling interest. The test suggested in this paper does not over-ride that requirement, it only
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limits the circumstances under which it will be applied. This is extremely important to prevent
abuse of the RFRA defense. Without such a threshold barrier, there is nothing to stop companies
from asserting that a law substantially burdens their free exercise of religion, thereby forcing the
government to unnecessarily assert compelling interests underlying many laws, perhaps resulting
in the anarchy foreseen by Justice Scalia.171
This solution would prevent the government from excessively interfering with a
company’s sincere religious beliefs while protecting our nation’s extremely important antidiscrimination statutes. Allowing RFRA as a defense without a threshold inquiry into the validity
of its application under the circumstances has the potential to significantly erode employees’
rights to be free from discrimination in the workplace. Substantial progress has been made since
1964, but we have a long way to go before workplace discrimination is eradicated.
The ministerial exception does not apply to excuse churches from anti-discrimination
laws as applied to non-ministerial employees; applying a RFRA defense should be similarly
limited. “Where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment does not stay the
application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII to the religious employer unless
Congress so provides.”172 Congress has provided for an exception through RFRA, but it should
be narrowly applied. Though it appears that through its holding in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme
Court has opened the door for closely-held, for-profit corporations to use RFRA as a defense to
claims of employment discrimination by the E.E.O.C., courts should heed the dissent’s warning
and limit these defenses by using a ministerial exception like analysis to address the substantial
burden question. This threshold inquiry will limit the RFRA defense to the instances in which
there really is a potential for unconstitutional burdens on the free exercise of religion, and
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prevent companies from abusing RFRA to undermine the purpose of the anti-discrimination
statutes.

36

